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Trajectories of anticipation: 
Preconceptuality and the task of reading habit
Sebastian Feil1
Abstract. The article characterizes Peirce’s concept of habit as a major contribution 
to a Peircean concept of preconceptuality, first, in relation to its function in the sign 
process, and second, in relation to other concepts of preconceptuality in cultural 
studies. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s notion of prejudice, Michel Foucault’s notions of 
the preconceptual and the dispositif, and Hans Blumenberg’s conception of meta-
phor all share certain key characteristics with Peirce’s notion of habit. The same 
comparison also highlights the fact that certain elements are missing from the cur-
rent discourse on Peirce’s notion of habit: although any rendition of the concept of 
habit itself implicitly relies on a theory of historicity and of rule-association, these 
aspects only emerge explicitly in comparison with theories that more explicitly 
focus on such aspects.
Another question raised in the context of such a comparison is the relevance of 
habit for theories of conceptuality. Peirce claims that descriptions of concepts are 
best realized through the description of the habits involved in them. A major part 
of a concept’s coordinative power lies with the habits associated with the concept. 
However, no systematic inquiry into the possibility of rendering actual habits more 
definitive in comprehension has been undertaken. An attempt is therefore made 
to remedy that situation by elaborating on those aspects of Peirce’s theory of habit 
relevant to a theory of “reading” habit, and to sketch an outline of such a theory.
Keywords: Peirce; habit; preconceptuality; prejudice; metaphor; history 
1. Introduction
Regarding the question as to which semiotic concepts best represent the effective-
ness of anticipation in sign use, Peirce’s concept of habit is a strong contender 
for the first place. Habit is the interface where Peirce’s theory of semiotics and 
pragmatism come together: it represents the possibility of conceptual guidance as 
well as the terminus of sign-action in successful practical adaptation of meaning. 
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So far, extensive attention has been paid to the ways in which habit relates to 
other elements of Peirce’s semiotics. In this regard, Donna West’s and Myrdene 
Anderson’s volume Consensus on Peirce’s Concept of Habit (2016) is a major land-
mark in the elucidation of the concept. Numerous contributions provide more and 
more intricate ways of describing the inner workings of the sign process in rela-
tion to habit. However, only a few inquire more deeply into the relation of Peirce’s 
concept of habit to other “anticipatory” concepts (Cannizzaro, Anderson 2016 and 
Bisanz, Cunningham 2016 being two of the more recent exceptions to that rule). 
And even fewer seem to be asking the question that seems most pressing from 
the point of view of the theory of meaning: is habit indeed a major factor in the 
guidance of symbolic life? And is the production of meaning as a whole substan-
tially dependent on habit? Is it not inevitable, then, that at some point we not only 
reach a consensus on how habit works, but also on how particular habits actually 
in operation at any given time can be described in such a way that we understand 
how meaning can be described not only as semantically discrete, but in relation to 
the vast field of prior experience active in the formation of any habit?
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, Section 3 is dedicated to a comparison 
between Peirce’s notion of habit and other ideas involving the prefiguration of lin-
guistic and extra-linguistic meaning. The choice of “other ideas” is focussed more 
specifically on theories of preconceptuality and is limited to theories that share 
with Peirce a strong commitment to a critique of Cartesian rationalism as the basis 
of a modern rejection of preconceptuality. What is included is, therefore, Hans-
Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutical notion of prejudice, Foucault’s evolving notion of 
the preconceptual as dispositif and Hans Blumenberg’s metaphorology. Secondly, 
Section 4 elaborates more fully on some aspects of Peirce’s concept of habit rel-
evant to the question of “reading” habit by building on some key ideas revolving 
around the notion of preconceptuality which have been generated through the 
cross-fertilization in the preceding comparison. 
In order to be able to limit productively the scope of aspects of Peirce’s concept 
of habit relevant to the overall discussion, a short summary of these aspects pre-
cedes Sections 3 and 4 – the main sections of the paper.
2. Peirce’s semiotic notion of habit
The concept of habit finds its way into Peirce’s writing in the prime of his rather 
explicit anti-Cartesianism. Descartes, in his Discours de la méthode, recounts his 
four precepts for “good conduct in reasoning”, enveloped in a recollection of his 
past scientific successes. The first rule is:
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[…] never to accept anything as true that I did not incontrovertibly know to be 
so; that is to say, carefully to avoid both prejudice and premature conclusions; 
and to include nothing in my judgements other than that which presented itself 
to my mind so clearly and distinctly, that I would have no occasion to doubt it. 
(Descartes 2006[1637]: 17)
Almost from the outset of his philosophical career, Peirce was strongly opposed to 
the idea that there could be any type of cognition completely devoid of all preju-
dice, “for [prejudices] are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned” 
(W2: 212). In his view, the reason for this is that any cognition is necessarily deter-
mined by previous cognitions, without any definitive beginning (cf. W2: 213).
Nine years later, in 1877, Peirce was convinced that there was an essential rela-
tion between what anyone believes and the habits that person holds. In “The fixa-
tion of belief ” (one of the Popular Science Monthly papers, W3: 242–257), Peirce 
links the attainment of belief to the formation of habit. This entails the possibility 
that habits are fixtures of knowledge as well as a pre-given of further knowledge, 
without denying that they are in fact open to change and manipulation. Peirce, 
while very much aware of the psychology of habit of the time, distinguishes him-
self from a strictly psychological view of habit and gives the concept, as it were, a 
logical spin (Feodorov 2017). The preference for a predominantly logical under-
standing of habit manifests itself quite overtly in the way Peirce associates habit 
formation (essentially, the formation of general rules within the organism) with 
the inductive mode of inference (e.g. in W2: 232–3; W3: 337; W8: 151). This is 
not unlike the way in which, for example, Wilhelm Dilthey (2002[1910]: 154–5) 
conceived of the “generalization” of “life experience”. However, already at this early 
stage in the development of the concept (and differently from Dilthey and his 
framework of Geisteswissenschaften) Peirce thought that the activation of habit, 
i.e. the way in which it becomes “suggestible by sensations” (W8: 151), is not solely 
the analysis of some a priori predicate contained in the rule. Prescriptions for 
thought and action are inferred from the rule involved in a habit but come to 
effect, first and foremost, through a “psychical process having the form of hypo-
thetic inference” (W8: 151).
After returning to the concept of habit and its relation to his semiotics on sev-
eral occasions (cf. Nöth 2016), in 1907 Peirce made his last concentrated effort 
to explain his pragmatism and properly integrate it into his semiotics, which, 
at this point, had become a universal theory of relations. The key move in this 
attempt (which variously goes under the title “Pragmatism” or by its manuscript 
number 318) was to explain the interpretant sign in terms of practical effects. 
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These ‘practical interpretants’2 are organized according to the mode of practical 
response vis-à-vis a sign-object relation. Peirce distinguishes between emotional, 
active and conceptual response and calls the corresponding signs “emotional”, 
“energetic” and “logical interpretant” (EP2: 409). They are continuously linked (i.e. 
emotional response and active response are contained in the conceptual response) 
and are not identical with the immediate, dynamical or final interpretant from 
1906 (CP 4.536). Instead, they are either an aspect of a subdivision of all three 
earlier conceptions of the interpretant (Short 2007: 57–59; Santaella 2016: 162–3) 
or the dynamical interpretant – an actually performed interpretation (Lalor 1997). 
Given how closely Peirce’s idea of the degrees of practical response in sign pro-
cesses is linked to the idea of the possibility of controlling infinite semiosis (cf. 
Short 2007: 59), this matter is of universal importance for semiotics. Moreover, 
‘habit’ is the key Peircean term that at once covers the entire range of “convention-
alized” meaning but also adds to the theory of ‘conventionality’ several distinct 
characteristics (Nöth 2010).
The argument here, however, is mainly concerned with the fact that the entire 
conception of practical responses would not be complete without reference to 
an auxiliary conception variously referred to by Peirce as the “Final Logical”, 
“Ultimate Logical” or “Ultimate Intellectual” Interpretant (EP2: 418, 419, 430, 
respectively). This variant nomenclature informs us about the central idea behind 
this concept, its intended designation of something akin to a definitive effect that 
cannot be honed any further:
It is evident that a definition, even if it be imperfect owing to vagueness, is an 
intellectual interpretant of the term it defines. But it is equally evident that it 
cannot be the ultimate intellectual interpretant, inasmuch as it is itself a sign, and 
a sign of the kind that has itself an intellectual interpretant, which is thereby an 
intellectual interpretant of the term defined. This consideration compels us to 
seek elsewhere than among signs, or among concepts, since they are all signs, for 
ultimate intellectual interpretants. This same consideration cuts off from search-
ing among desires, expectations, etc., for ultimate intellectual interpretants, since 
such intellectual character as desires, etc., possess is due solely to their referring to 
concepts. At the same time, the ultimate intellectual interpretants must be some 
kind of mental effects of the signs they interpret. Now after an examination of all 
varieties of mental phenomena, the only ones I have been able to find that possess 
the requisite generality to interpret concepts and which fulfill the other conditions 
are habits. (EP2: 431)
2 Peirce earlier called a very close variation of these the “responsive interpretant” (NEM4: 
317).
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Definitions, being conceptual responses, are, according to Peirce, limited to the 
realm of semiotic referentiality and thus have no characters capable of limiting 
and thus anchoring semiosis. Likewise, emotional stimuli for action, like desire, 
are naturally cut off from providing grounds for intellectual closure, since they are 
merely coordinative of action in relation to concepts themselves. Habit, however, 
is capable of providing guidance across the entire spectrum of possible practi-
cal responses. According to Mats Bergman (2016: 171), the basic outlook that 
final/ultimate logical interpretant should be narrowed down to habit is “widely 
accepted”. Hence, Bergman devotes an interesting article to exploring the conse-
quent possibility that (1) “Peirce’s pragmatic account of the interpretant surpasses 
that of mere explication of habitual meaning” (Bergman 2016: 173) and that (2) 
the pragmatic method (“consider what effects…”, W3: 266) is therefore capable not 
only of ascertaining meaning, but also that “its animating goal is the controlled 
improvement of our symbolic habits” (Bergman 2016: 185). Such a conception of 
‘conceptual meliorism’ (see also Bergman 2012) is easy to accept, especially since 
its weak version – that habits do change according to circumstance (usually not 
at once, but after some pressure has been applied) – is quite uncontroversial. The 
problem posed by this weak version is of course that any uncontrolled modifica-
tion of a symbol, concept or habit may lead to improvement as well as deteriora-
tion. Thus, Bergman explicitly follows one particular trail of inquiry outlined by 
Peirce. In conjunction with the pragmatic maxim, and as far as ‘habit-change’ 
is concerned, Peirce wanted to restrict the final logical interpretant (the “living 
definition”) to the “deliberately formed, self-analyzing habit” (EP2: 418). Peirce 
explicated ‘self-analysing’ as “formed by the aid of analysis of the exercises that 
nourished it” (EP2: 418), and the implication is clear: in order to attain better 
concepts, one has to improve one’s final logical interpretants, i.e. one’s habits. This, 
however, raises an important issue. If the ultimate aim of a pragmatistically ori-
ented semiotics is also to present a model for the modification of pre-existing 
habits, then such a model needs to incorporate a method for the identification of 
habits. Change, so to speak, requires anticipation. Such a method has clearly been 
a pragmatistic desideratum from the beginning, as is evident in a footnote Peirce 
appended to the paragraph of the final “Pragmatism” draft quoted above:
Meaning of a general physical predicate consists in the conception of the habit of 
its subject that it implies. 
And such must be the meaning of a psychical predicate. 
The habits must be known by experience which however exhibits singulars only. 
Our minds must generalize these. 
How is this to be done? (EP2: 550)
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The fact that there is only a rough draft of an answer to this central methodologi-
cal question in an earlier draft of the “Pragmatism” manuscript3 is, in my opinion, 
a challenge that needs to be faced, especially when one believes that working on 
a truly interdisciplinary commens (or “Communicational Interpretant”, cf. EP2: 
478) for the interpretation of life and culture is indeed one of the primary tasks of 
semiotics in general. The lack thereof becomes especially evident when looking 
at other conceptions of conceptual guidance that have developed in the various 
areas of hermeneutics and conceptual history in the continental tradition, where 
semiotics often plays only a minor role, but has a great potential for inserting itself 
in these discourses in convincing ways. The following section is thus dedicated to 
exploring the relationship between Peirce’s notion of habit and three prominent 
models of conceptual conditionality present in continental thought.
3. Habit in comparison
It is difficult to say whether Peirce ever directly associated the concepts of preju-
dice (as employed by Descartes) and habit. Both concepts, however, share a sys-
temic function in the context of his discussions of the “normative sciences” and 
especially “logic” (EP2: 60), which highlights a striking similarity between the two 
concepts. The main point of comparison between these terms is that both ‘preju-
dice’ and ‘habit’ (as well as a few somewhat singular variants like “preconceived 
notion” in EP2: 81–84, 114)4 refer to a collectively distributed structure – neither 
immediately clear nor uncontroversially distinct – that contributes to the prefigu-
ration of understanding within the individual. The choice of ‘habit’ over ‘prejudice’ 
for the comparative purpose of this paper is legitimate for two reasons: first, habit 
entails ‘preconceptuality’ in the broadest sense possible, describing pre-intentional 
phenomena across the entire biosphere – from regular energy discharges in the 
individual cell (W6: 191) to human intellectual history of and beyond entire 
epochs – as “links in forming the endless chain of humanity” (Dewey 2008[1922]: 
19). Second, habit, as we have seen, is the particular term that Peirce did indeed 
deem important enough to be discussed in conjunction with his comprehensive 
semiotic theory. There, as we have also seen, some form of preconceptuality quite 
3 Th e third draft , composed a few months before the fi ft h and fi nal one, see, e.g., the intro-
ductory notes in EP2: 398.
4 Among other things, the term ‘preconceived notion’ is also representative of Peirce’s 
conceptual meliorism. He explicitly insisted that one major benefi t of learning about history 
is to overcome one’s ‘preconceived notions’ (EP2: 83–84; see Feil, Olteanu 2018 on some of the 
consequences arising from this view).
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explicitly covers the entire range of practical activity, from emotional to logical 
response, from ‘tenacity’ via ‘authority’ and ‘fashion’ all the way to ‘science’ (W2: 
254).
The aim now is to show how semiotics integrates with other approaches to 
preconceptual guidance. In general, the argument rests on the notion that any 
theory of preconceptuality is conditional on some form of anti-Cartesian stance. 
This is in line with Peirce’s idea already indicated above that cognition in general 
is always the result of previous cognitions, that any thought is always preceded by 
something which cannot be eliminated because it is already fundamental to the 
realization of that same thought.
Choosing ‘habit’ has less to do with being biased towards a particular theory 
and more with the simple fact that (1) we are looking for a semiotic theory to inte-
grate as many specific theories of preconceptuality as possible, and that (2) Peirce 
offers a semiotic theory with a notion of preconceptuality already included. The 
aim is thus not to establish any form of hierarchy between different concepts and 
approaches but simply to rely on the most general concept available to semiotics. 
The positions compared are often portrayed as ideologically conflicting. If nothing 
else, the merit of comparing these different approaches from a more general van-
tage point shows that such conflicts are avoidable. Moreover, such a comparison 
will reveal a number of things which have previously not been considered with 
regard to the nature of habit itself.
3.1. Gadamer: preconceptuality through history
The first of the three anti-Cartesians discussed is Hans-Georg Gadamer, whose 
conceptions of ‘tradition’ and especially ‘prejudice’ have left an indelible mark on 
phenomenological hermeneutics in general (cf. e.g. Fehér 2016). Consider this 
famous paragraph from his major book Truth and Method, in which he links indi-
vidual ‘prejudice’ to collective practice, and which precisely addresses those practi-
cal entanglements of subjectivity existing as precursors to reflexive habit-change:
Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, 
we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in 
which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness 
of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is 
why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the 
historical reality of his being. (Gadamer 2013[1960]: 289)
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Against the backdrop of a naive form of rationalism, Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
conceives of subjectivity as essentially premodified by collectivity – and collectiv-
ity by history. This form of contextual objectivism is comparable to Peirce’s con-
viction that signification stands on its own and “that neither an utterer, nor even, 
perhaps, an interpreter is essential to a sign” (EP2: 404), at least insofar as both 
views preclude psychology from being fundamental for understanding. ‘Prejudice’ 
is supposed to play a quintessential role insofar as it is constitutive for any type of 
understanding whatsoever. Thus, in Truth and Method, in the well-known chapter 
on “Elements of a theory of hermeneutic experience”, Gadamer (2013[1960]: 283) 
writes:
The recognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice gives 
the hermeneutical problem its real thrust. In light of this insight it appears that 
historicism, despite its critique of rationalism and of natural law philosophy, is 
based on the modern Enlightenment and unwittingly shares its prejudices. And 
there is one prejudice of the Enlightenment that defines its essence: the funda-
mental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice itself, 
which denies tradition its power. 
The 19th-century historicists mentioned here argued that pure Cartesian ratio-
nalism as well as scientistic naturalistic reduction do not do justice to what they 
consider the prime agent of humanity, that is, history. Gadamer, however, asserts 
that historicism’s belief, while correct in its assessment, is misguided insofar as it 
sustains the idea that prejudice can be transcended eventually (Odenstedt 2003). 
This, Gadamer argues, contradicts the essential connection between history and 
prejudice. And it is at this stage of the argument that Gadamer himself feels com-
fortable enough to make actually explicit a clearly delimited prejudice, something 
that he will, in the course of Truth and Method, deny ever being fully possible. 
Understanding is patently “not a method which the inquiring consciousness 
applies to an object it chooses and so turns it into objective knowledge”, but “an 
event, and the task of hermeneutics, seen philosophically, consists in asking what 
kind of understanding, what kind of science it is, that is itself advanced by histori-
cal change” (Gadamer 2013[1960]: 320). Gadamer’s hermeneutics thus argues for 
the necessity to accept the preconceptual but gives us no methodological clues 
apart from submitting oneself to the eventuality of tradition.
Nevertheless, while strongly overemphasizing the impossibility of arriving at 
secure knowledge, Gadamer’s insistence on the need always to monitor one’s prej-
udices is of some value. No single cognitive position is ever entirely pre-theoretical 
(i.e. intuitive). This does not mean, however, that every position is fundamentally 
flawed, but simply that every position rests on preconceptions. 
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Moreover, a point can be made in favour of Gadamer’s assessment of under-
standing as an event. Events and their constitutive action can certainly be 
described. And the focal point of action is, as Peirce put it, habit. There is thus a 
fundamental compatibility between Gadamerian hermeneutics and Peircean prag-
matist semiotics. The sole point of divergence is a difference in the assessment of 
the possibility of habit-change: Gadamer’s concept of ‘prejudice-change’ is, at best, 
limited to random changes in tradition. The general phenomenological metaphor 
of a perpetually elusive ‘horizon’, to which Gadamer (e.g. 2013[1960]: 246) sub-
scribes, is thus very apt, if perhaps unintentionally so. Submission to prejudice, in 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, is the result of such a figuration of finality as “unreach-
able”. Peirce, on the other hand, is able to assert an element of reflexivity vis-à-vis 
the ‘ultimate intellectual interpretant’ precisely because the conception of finality 
contained in his concept of habit is fundamentally procedural.
Nevertheless, Gadamer also adds one important element to a general concep-
tion of preconceptuality, which is only implicit in Peirce’s account, namely history. 
In the same way that prejudice is an intersubjective effect resulting from processes 
that predate the subjective present, habit-formation and habit-change typically do 
not happen instantaneously but after a series of inductions performed on similar 
events over time. One merit of this comparison for semiotics in general is that it 
shows that sign processes, in so far as they are guided by habit, require models 
that incorporate an element of diachronic analysis tailored to the explication of 
the preconceptual.
3.2. Foucault: preconceptuality through power
Michael Foucault, anti-Cartesian by way of being a strong anti-subjectivist, has 
for decades been a fixture in continental thought as a philosopher of history who 
went, as Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1983) put it, “beyond hermeneutics 
and structuralism”. The reason for including Foucault in this comparison is thus to 
see how his engagement with the possible depth and orderliness of meaning fares 
in comparison to a general semiotic perspective on meaning as habit.
Dealing with the formation and functions of what Foucault calls ‘discourse’ 
in The Archaeology of Knowledge, he also dedicates a chapter to the formation 
of concepts. At the centre of this discussion is the idea of a ‘pre-conceptual’ 
(préconceptuel) level, on which alternative and even contradictory “concepts can 
coexist” next to each other through “the rules to which this field is subjected” 
(Foucault 2002[1969]: 67). Uncovering the preconceptual is the task of what he 
calls “General Grammar” (Foucault 2002[1969]: 69). According to this set of 
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methodological guidelines, analyses of the preconceptual require generalization 
of specific utterances, yet neither in terms of the generality of natural languages 
alone nor from a practically remote “horizon of ideality, placed, discovered, or 
established by a founding gesture” (Foucault 2002[1969]: 68–69; Foucault is refer-
ring to the Kantian transcendental a priori). Instead, the preconceptual works pre-
dominantly on “the most ‘superficial’ level”, the level of discourse itself, which is 
the locus of the emergence of concepts:
By that very fact, it is no longer necessary to appeal to the themes of an end-
lessly withdrawing origin and inexhaustible horizon: the organization of a group 
of rules in the practice of discourse, even if it does not constitute an event so easy 
to situate as a formulation or a discovery, may be determined, however, in the ele-
ment of history; and if it is inexhaustible, it is by that very fact that the perfectly 
describable system that it constitutes takes account of a very considerable set of 
concepts and a very large number of transformations that affect both these con-
cepts and their relations. Instead of outlining a horizon that rises from the depths 
of history and maintains itself through history, the ‘preconceptual’ thus described 
is, on the contrary, at the most ‘superficial’ level (at the level of discourse), the 
group of rules that in fact operate within it. (Foucault 2002[1969]: 69)
The preconceptual is thus a performative precondition emerging from history, 
but not from a point indefinitely far away (like Gadamer’s horizon of prejudice). 
And it is “inexhaustible”, which means that it is strictly general. Foucault, quite 
unironically, called such discursive elements preceding intentional modification 
the “historical a priori”:
Juxtaposed, these two words produce a rather startling effect [un effet un peu 
criant/screeching]; what I mean by the term is an a priori that is not a condition of 
validity for judgements, but a condition of reality for statements. It is not a ques-
tion of rediscovering what might legitimize an assertion, but of freeing [“isoler”, 
to isolate] the conditions of emergence of statements, the law of their coexistence 
with others, the specific form of their mode of being, the principles according to 
which they survive, become transformed, and disappear. An a priori not of truths 
that might never be said, or really given to experience; but the a priori of a history 
that is given, since it is that of things actually said. (Foucault 2002[1969]:143)
Over the following years, extralinguistic practices were increasingly included in 
the concept of discourse (Foucault 1981), so the preconceptual also had to move 
away from being limited to language. Power and its relation to Foucault’s project 
of the “history of the present” (Foucault 1977: 31) took over several conceptual 
functions relating to the pre-intentional conditions of discourse. 
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The relationship between Foucault’s notion of power and Peirce’s notion of 
habit has some affinities that have been examined by Andrew Garnar (2006). 
However, Garnar captures that relationship from a point of view where power 
results in the unilateral determination of habit. This is rooted in an understand-
ing of power which Foucault shared in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977), but 
fails to include an important modification Foucault made to his concept of power 
after the publication of the first volume of The History of Sexuality. In the former, 
power was still captured in the metaphor of a two-dimensional foundational “net-
work” (Foucault 1978: 95). A few years later, however, power was conceived of as 
a structure that is logically recursive:
In general terms, I believe that power is not built up out of ‘wills’ (individual or 
collective), nor is it derivable from interests. Power is constructed and functions 
on the basis of particular powers, myriad issues, myriad effects of power. It is this 
complex domain that must be studied. (Foucault 1980: 188)
This interactive conception of (strategic) power expresses Foucault’s view that 
intentionality is a secondary effect in social interactions, while at the same time 
clarifying that power is foundational only when considered in conjunction with 
particular and diverse instalments of power. Power was thus complemented by 
a concept that can be regarded as a sort of obverse of habit, the dispositif. This 
“system of relations” is thought to mediate between “a thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philanthropic propositions - in short, the said as much as the unsaid” 
(Foucault 1980: 194). It also “responds to an urgent need” (Foucault 1980: 195), 
meaning that it has a strictly practical dimension that does not develop from 
intentionality, but from a pre-intentional dimension of (perceived) general neces-
sity. Foucault thought that the concept of the dispositif would show “the nature of 
the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements” (Foucault 
1980: 195) and that all these elements contributed to power as much as they were 
formed by power. Giorgio Agamben later showed that the concept of the disposi-
tif does not merely include elements that are usually associated with fields such 
as politics, law, and education, where power typically resides, but is in fact also 
deeply engrained in the structure of everyday life:
Further expanding the already large class of Foucauldian apparatuses, I shall 
call an apparatus literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, 
orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, 
opinions, or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, madhouses, 
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the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, juridical measures, and 
so forth (whose connection with power is in a certain sense evident), but also the 
pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, comput-
ers, cellular telephones and – why not language itself, which is perhaps the most 
ancient of apparatuses – one in which thousands and thousands of years ago a 
primate inadvertently let himself be captured, probably without realizing the con-
sequences that he was about to face. (Agamben 2009:14)5
From the point of view of this expansion of the dispositif into everyday practice 
outside of the immediate influence of the larger assemblies of power, an essential 
connection between discourse, power and habit is beginning to show. All of these 
concepts are devised to represent the conservation of regularity (linguistic and/
or practical) and pass it on into the future. Habit, in this context, can function 
as an essential complement as it quite comprehensively represents, as a smallest 
common denominator, how “power relations can materially penetrate the body in 
depth, without depending even on the mediation of the subject’s own representa-
tions” (Foucault 1980: 186). Foucault’s later technical renditions of power were, of 
course, necessary to show that power is also, and especially, an effect that exists 
apart from individual and sovereign will, but its interface is still tied to practice 
that is adopted by and collectively shared between individuals. Thus, to know 
about power that is actually in effect means to know about the habits that antici-
pate individual action in relation to power.6
A comparison between habit and (Foucauldian) power intensifies what the 
Gadamer-Peirce comparison already indicated. It shows that Peirce’s pragmaticist-
semiotic notion of habit covers a wide range of effects that are investigated in cul-
tural theory and that it is therefore possible (and productive) to render these areas 
of knowledge in terms of a general semiotic terminology. Conversely, this com-
parison also shows that a semiotic theory that claims to be universally applicable 
should ideally also be an interpretive semiotics that is self-aware of the historical 
conditions of emergence of the possible interpretations it describes. Signs inter-
preting signs, we are told by Peirce, will effect some practical response, whether 
that be an emotion, an individual action, or the formation of a concept. All of 
these types of responses, however, are always already premodified by a habitual 
response emerging from their practical historical conditions.
5 Th e English translation of Agamben’s text follows the established English translation of 
‘dispositif’ as ‘apparatus’, conceived of perhaps under the infl uence of Althusser’s notion of the 
‘state apparatus’.
6 See Feil (2019) for a complementary outlook on the relation particularly between Dewey’s 
concept of habit and Foucault’s concept of power in its transition from foundational to 
pragmatically recursive structures.
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3.3. Blumenberg: preconceptuality through conceptuality
The same conditions of emergence of statements that motivate Foucault’s inves-
tigation into the preconceptual are, if at the outset seemingly unconcerned with 
“what is actually being said” (Foucault 2002[1969]: 143; see above), the focus of 
Hans Blumenberg’s ‘metaphorological’ project. Blumenberg quite explicitly iden-
tifies a central aspect of Cartesian rationality as his motivation for engagement. 
In the Cartesian school of thought, he argues, metaphors “were an expression of 
the same précipitation regarding which Descartes, likewise in the first rule, states 
that it ought carefully to be avoided” (Blumenberg 2016[1960]: 2). Similarly with 
Peirce and his dual conception of prejudice and habit, a main point of focus of 
metaphorology is the way in which anticipatory elements of cognition received 
a somewhat negative connotation as ultimately avoidable precipitation in purely 
rationalistic models of cognition. Thus, the core of Blumenberg’s thought on 
conceptuality is a theory that resists the rationalistic impulse which suggests that 
metaphors (and transitional tropes in general) are nothing but residual scrap 
language, are mere “rudiments on the path from mythos to logos” (Blumenberg 
2016[1960]: 3). Blumenberg (2016[1960]: 3) confronts the scientistic fantasy of an 
ideal language with his notion of the ‘absolute metaphor’:
[M]etaphors can also [...] be foundational elements of philosophical language, 
‘translations’ that resist being converted back into authenticity and logicality. If 
it could be shown that such translations, which would have to be called ‘absolute 
metaphors’, exist, then one of the essential tasks of conceptual history (in the thus 
expanded sense) would be to ascertain and analyze their conceptually irredeem-
able expressive function. 
The basic idea of the ‘absolute metaphor’ is thus that conceptual thought is in 
many cases irrevocably preconditioned by the aid of some sort of apperceptive 
support. This metaphorical aspect inevitably welds with the concepts in such a 
way that it can be said to be the concept itself. This is not unlike Peirce’s idea 
that a habit is the final logical interpretant (EP2: 418) and not merely represented 
by it. In both cases, some preconceptual entity ontologically frames the conse-
quent concept. Moreover, Peirce’s own view of metaphor is not too different from 
Blumenberg’s:
Metaphysics has been said contemptuously to be a fabric of metaphors. But not 
only metaphysics, but logical and phaneroscopical concepts need to be clothed in 
such garments. For a pure idea without metaphor or other significant clothing is 
an onion without a peel. (EP2: 392)
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One major implication of Peirce’s onion metaphor is that if one were to remove 
all imaginative support from a concept, the concept itself would be bound to dis-
appear completely, just like an onion would disappear upon removal of the final 
layer. This is an approach to conceptuality not quite in line with what Peircean 
semiotics as logic, including his theory of metaphor (e.g. Anderson 1984; 
Hausman 1996), is generally associated with. However, as will become clear, it is 
an approach that has some resonance with his conception of habit.
After spending some 20 years working on several other projects as well as 
showing that ‘absolute metaphors’ do in fact exist, it dawned on Blumenberg 
that what he had had in mind in 1960 was not merely an auxiliary method for 
the history of concepts. Instead, ‘metaphorology’, in the later view, now is to be 
“no longer directed mainly toward the constitution of conceptuality but back 
toward the connections with the life-world as the constant motivating support 
(though one that cannot be constantly kept in view) of all theory” (Blumenberg 
1997[1979]: 81).
Blumenberg’s later view incorporates the idea that metaphor not only oper-
ates within language and structures the way we conceptualize things linguisti-
cally, but that conceptualizations are the result of practical necessities resulting 
from the ‘normal’ backdrop of the (life-)world and are mediated through met-
aphor (hence the support that theory receives from the life-world). This cen-
tral idea of Blumenberg’s much expanded general theory of ‘nonconceptuality’ 
(Unbegrifflichkeit) predates several now prominent theories of ‘conceptual’ and 
‘cognitive’ metaphors by more than a decade. However, this basic similarity 
between conceptions of ‘cognitive’ and ‘conceptual’ metaphors and Blumenberg’s 
notion also warrants a closer look at the Kantian framing of Blumenberg’s theory 
of metaphor since Kant is the general precursor of most modern theories of sche-
maticity. This comparison should then shed some light on what is at stake with 
nonconceptuality and make its relevance to the semiotics of habit clear.
Peirce’s subdivision of iconic signs into three distinct modes, image, diagram 
and metaphor from the 1903 “Syllabus of certain topics of logic” (EP2: 274) is gen-
erally well known. Only slightly less well known is the precursor that these hypoi-
cons are, perhaps unintentionally, modelled on, namely Immanuel Kant’s subdivi-
sion of different types of intuitions into the reality of concepts, i.e. image/example, 
schema, and symbol. The idea of the schema has, of course, been extensively 
discussed in conjunction with Peirce’s concept of the diagram (Stjernfelt 2007: 
89–116, esp. 94). However, the point can be made that it is rather the Kantian 
concept of the symbol that provides the key to understanding the relation between 
habit and metaphor together with the idea of their respective hypothetical natures.
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From the outset, Kant’s investigation into the analogical is moving beyond 
the linguistic, albeit often being rendered in examples from natural languages. In 
Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant claims and defends the idea that “beauty” 
is “a symbol of morality” (as goes the title of the chapter, Kant 2000[1790]: 225). 
By showing that it is possible to link entire sets of possible apperceptions to a set 
of moral actions, Kant demonstrates that his conception of symbolicity is indeed 
a universal property of understanding and its requisite power of judgment (cf. 
Friedlander 2015: 11), and is not limited to language alone:
All intuitions that are ascribed to concepts a priori are thus either schemata or 
symbols, the first of which contain direct, the second indirect presentations of 
the concept. The first do this demonstratively, the second by means of an anal-
ogy (for which empirical intuitions are also employed), in which the power of 
judgment performs a double task, first applying the concept to the object of a 
sensible intuition, and then, second, applying the mere rule of reflection on that 
intuition to an entirely different object, of which the first is only the symbol. Thus 
a monarchical state is represented by a body with a soul if it is ruled in accordance 
with laws internal to the people, but by a mere machine (like a handmill) if it is 
ruled by a single absolute will, but in both cases it is represented only symboli-
cally. For between a despotic state and a handmill there is, of course, no similarity, 
but there is one between the rule for reflecting on both and their causality. (Kant 
2000[1790]: 226)
It is quite obvious that, by describing the symbol, Kant had in mind something 
akin to metaphor, and precisely in the enhanced sense that Blumenberg came to 
realize with the idea of the unconceptual linking theory back to the lifeworld. 
Kantian symbolicity involves indirect presentation which relies on the (imagi-
native) power of judgment to apply the rule of a sensible intuition to an object 
outside the extension presented, which is thereby likened to the intuition on the 
basis of the rule alone. This, however, is also the basic mode of operation of habit, 
at least insofar as habit is, in fact, genuinely hypothetical and involves a certain 
amount of freedom not reducible to the schematic, where diagrams (as relational 
rules) are initially reproduced in a strictly identity-conserving way (NEM4: 318).
Blumenberg’s metaphorology thus fashions preconceptuality in a way that is 
highly compatible with Peirce’s theory of habit. Its focus on ‘unconceptuality’ reso-
nates well with Peirce’s idea that while preconceptuality is a pre-given of any cog-
nitive process whatsoever, it is ultimately coordinated from a practically formed 
vantage point outside the immediate semiotic domain of that concept, i.e. habit. 
Conversely, if seen through the lens of Kant’s theory of the symbol, it highlights an 
important detail regarding habituality in Peirce’s semiotics: all transitional entities 
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comparable to metaphors effect their significance (or, like habits, their modifica-
tion of significance) through a process that does not directly replicate itself in the 
target domain, but merely its ‘rule for reflection’. Just as metaphors do not create 
identity between ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’, that is to say, just like Achilles is not the tiger, 
an action or thought resulting from a habitually acquired rule does not follow the 
rule mechanically (see also West 2016: 227), but uses the rule to effectively ‘enrich’ 
a situation by vaguely suggesting that rule. Incidentally, understanding habit in 
such a way also lends a comprehensive conceptual framework and a semiotic out-
look to Peirce’s ‘hypothesis’ claim.
4. “Reading” habit
The purpose of this section is (1) to explore further the Peircean claim already 
mentioned in Section 1 that habit becomes “suggestible by sensations [...] by a 
psychical process having the form of hypothetic inference” (W8: 151) and (2) to 
reflect on the conditions of possibility of the “reading” habit.
Peirce’s ‘hypothesis’ claim was first established in the 1892 “Law of Mind” 
where “hypothesis” is also further specified as “induction from qualities” (W8: 
151).7 The whole process of habit-taking is specified as follows:
Thus, by induction, a number of sensations followed by one reaction become 
united under one general idea followed by the same reaction; while by the hypo-
thetic process, a number of reactions called for by one occasion get united in a 
general idea which is called out by the same occasion. By deduction, the habit 
fulfills its function of calling out certain reactions on certain occasions. (W8: 151)
Peirce invokes the whole range of inferential modes at his disposal at the time to 
make the process clear. Induction synthesizes under one general idea any number 
of sensations tied to one reaction. Conversely, deduction analytically resolves 
established generalizations into further action for further occasions. The most 
revealing step involves the intermediate ‘hypothetic process’, where habit is in fact 
organized in an interesting way. The qualitative inductions underlying this process 
involve a capacity for judgment exercised on qualities, i.e. on “characters in com-
prehension (conjunctive terms, icons) [...]: we say that something which possesses 
a sample of the characters of a thing possesses all the characters of that thing (i.e., 
7 Note that ‘hypothetic inference’, specifi ed as ‘qualitative induction’, should not be mistaken 
for what Peirce later properly called abduction. On the main diff erence, including a discussion 
of Peirce’s own mistake, see, for example, Bellucci 2018: 2–6.
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is that thing whose characters it possesses)” (Bellucci 2018: 3). Hypothetic inference 
is thus responsible for decisions on the aptness of any given habit in relation to an 
occasion. And any such decision is based on hypothesis, which (among other things) 
explains why habits, as generals, can also come to bear on “inadequate” occasions.
If, for example, as a regular user of public transport, one is habituated to inter-
pret certain minor cues from fellow passengers as signs of their desire to leave the 
vehicle, one may, over time, begin to anticipate these desires and behave accord-
ingly (e.g. by picking up a bag previously placed on the floor, or by “preemptively” 
turning sideways so as to facilitate the passage of the fellow passenger). A habit (of 
unobstructiveness or consideration) has been formed by quantitative induction 
through the subsumption of a series of occasions successfully managed by way of 
a certain reaction. The habit thus formed is activated deductively when the appro-
priate occasion arises. However, cues remarkably similar to those actually habitu-
ated can trigger the habit in spite of the actual adequacy of the habit. A fellow pas-
senger may, after a minute-long silence, turn towards the habit-bearer, but not to 
ask her to move, but to ask for the time. Or, conversely, some uneasy twitching of 
a fellow passenger may be taken as a sign that she is deeply involved in the music 
playing in her headphones, while in fact she is getting ready to stand up from her 
seat to get off at the next station. In every case, habit depends on some low-key 
interpretation of similarity between sensation, rule and occasion to determine 
whether the particular occasion fits the rule or general idea. In any case, however, 
an occasion will establish the frame of reference for subsequent action or thought 
and may even predetermine the interpretation of sensations deemed relevant.
The necessary mediation performed by such an intermediate step of hypothetic 
inference shows that there is no strict identity between one clearly defined habit 
and one clearly defined occasion, even though many habits are firmly tied to cer-
tain sensations and occasions in such a way that they seem almost mechanical. 
For a habit actually to become useful, it must become general. Still, generality is 
not identity in actuality, and it always involves some type of premeditated form 
of judgment. This, in turn, is the precondition for Peirce’s idea that the presence 
of habit is not necessarily informative of some definitive meaning: “No Symbol”, 
writes Peirce in the “Prolegomena for an Apology for Pragmatism” (1906), “can 
do more than apply a ‘rule of thumb’ resting as it does entirely on Habit (including 
under this term natural disposition); and a Habit is no evidence” (NEM4: 317).
This poses a conundrum: habit is an essential component in the generation 
and interpretation of meaning, at least as far as vaguely symbolic meaning is con-
cerned. Yet there is no definitive way of fixing meaning retroactively, since it must 
be derived from habit, and habit, not only in its formation but also in its applica-
tion, involves an element of non-necessary inference.
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Moreover, the fact that habit is “no evidence” precisely means that no definitive 
clarity can be derived from stating that “this is a habit for that”. Even knowing that 
a certain habit is in operation will not with absolute certainty allow the person 
aware of this to predict clearly what the actual effect of every possible application 
of that habit will be. From the point of view of clarity and distinctness, it seems 
that habit, while being an all-pervasive component of symbolic life, is a rather 
fruitless point of interpretive focus. Habit lends guidance and structure to innu-
merable new interpretations but is itself very hard to pin down.
Anticipating anticipation is therefore imprecise precisely because of this non-
evidential character that, by analogy, links rule and qualitative evaluation on a 
provisional basis. Perfect clarity in a Cartesian sense is simply precluded. This may 
seem counterintuitive, given that actions derived from habit often appear as very 
clear-cut cases. However, this is perhaps more a testimony to the fact that reason-
ably formed hypotheses based on the prior experience of rules are generally not 
unreliable. And it is also true that habit does in fact enhance any given situation 
by linking it to the subject’s capacities (as, for instance, the reasonably formed 
habit of consideration in the example above). Still, neither does any occurrence 
of a habitual response necessarily suggest a certain type of situation, nor does any 
particular type of situation necessarily suggest a corresponding habit. This entails 
that, just as a seemingly arbitrary expression emerges from repeated success in the 
application of one metaphor, a habit can become uncoupled from the context of its 
inductive formation and begin to lead a more general “life”. In the “Habit” lecture 
(1898) published in Reasoning and the Logic of Things, which, among other things, 
set out to defend the distinctness of several modes of association by resemblance, 
Peirce makes a remark in that regard:
But the repeated occurrence of a general idea and the experience of its utility, 
results in the formation or strengthening of that habit which is the conception; or 
if the conception is already a habit thoroughly compacted, the general idea is the 
mark of the habit. (RLT 234)
General ideas which represent the expectation of certain relations have the capac-
ity to modify and even to constitute habit, ideally by confirmation from experi-
ence. And, as Peirce put it in the Minute Logic (1902), the imagination, too, is 
capable of forming habits (CP 2.148). This means that habits are not only activated 
internally by hypothetic inference, but are also transformed, not by the brute force 
of experience alone, but also through internal reflection on the possible associa-
tion of rules (as diagrams). This is the case simply because they are intrinsically 
linked to general ideas which leave potentially traceable marks on cognition. Habit 
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therefore represents a type of generality not restricted to discrete formations, but 
as strict continuity in the sense that it involves a “relation or relations of contigu-
ity”, which implies the possibility of “a passage from one part to a contiguous part” 
(CP 7.535 fn6). Habits realized in individual bearers are linked to each other by 
bordering on each other in a continuum that emerges over time.
Commenting on the task of “reading” habits is motivated by the prior assessment 
of habit’s essential connection to conceptualization and its resulting coordinative 
power which links its bearers to their environments. As Peirce expressed it in the 
“Pragmatism” manuscript, “the most perfect account of a concept that words can 
convey will consist in a description of the habit which that concept is calculated 
to produce” (EP2: 418). However, considering the phenomenal historicity of habit 
itself, attention must shift away from the mere confirmation of present habit in 
the future when “reading” habit. Before admitting his perplexity regarding a pro-
cedure of generalizing “experience which however exhibits singulars only” (EP2: 
550, see above), Peirce had already elaborated on the idea of “future confirmation” 
in an earlier draft of the “Pragmatism” manuscript:
But how otherwise can a habit be described than by a description of the kind of 
action to which it gives rise, with the specification of the conditions and of the 
motive? (EP2: 418)
Knowing well that this question was meant to be merely rhetorical, there is some 
merit in taking it as an actual question and elaborating upon its implications. 
Especially given the fact that the type of habit identified by this type of specifica-
tion does not do justice to precisely what Peirce’s refined concept of habit actu-
ally involves, an attempt at explicating the ‘otherwise’ in the question is justified. 
Following Peirce’s suggestion, one would describe a supposed habit by deducing 
from it the coordinates for a possible type of thought or action under possible 
conditions and to a possible end. Accordingly, one would set up an experiment 
for future confirmation. If we assume habit H in conjunction with action A, con-
ditions C and motive M, and if we then detect the occurrence of action A, condi-
tions C and motive M in some observation, we infer that habit H is in operation. 
However, this purely empirical verification is suitable only for the most clear-cut 
of cases and in itself involves only a very basic abductory step.
In order actually to assume the existence of a habit in the first place, we must 
already have detected some type of regularity, thus we must have performed some 
type of “reading”. The ‘general mark’-idea metaphorically suggests that “reading” 
is a valid operation, at least in theory, given the essential connection between 
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concepts and their anticipatory content and practice. It is therefore perhaps actu-
ally necessary to start with the 1898 idea that “a general idea is the mark of habit” 
(see above) and combine that premise with the general condition, established in 
the experimental setup, that some sort of temporal distance is required between 
habit-formation and -modification and the actual occurrence of a habit in the 
empirical world. Not every general idea is automatically the mark of a habit; this is 
the case only if the habit has been, as Peirce expressed it, “thoroughly compacted” 
(RLT: 234). This compacting, of course, entails generalization to a degree that 
makes the habit “lean” enough to detach itself from its conditions and motives 
of origin. The primary vehicle of this process, as we have seen (particularly in 
the Blumenberg/Kant section), is the skeletal rule manifest in the diagram (also 
Vitral 2019 141–144). And this rule-component of habit can also be clearly stated 
regardless of the specifics of its application.
The task of “reading” a habit involves, as Peirce put it in the previously quoted 
footnote to the last draft of “Pragmatism”, the requirement that “our minds must 
generalize these” (see above). Generalization in that sense includes hypothetically 
moving back in time and looking at precursors to the ideas that are suspected to 
serve as marks of a habit, specifying the more general conditions and motives and 
comparing them to the present. In short, reading a habit, that is, forming a sys-
tematic hypothesis on the expectations which a concept transports, requires from 
the very outset a historical perspective, a practical orientation, and a sensibility 
for the reflexive transmission of rules. It requires the construction (or rather the 
reconstruction) of trajectories of anticipation through time according to the ways 
in which rules embodied in habits are successfully adopted. It is through the iden-
tification of these trajectories that habits actually in operation are more compre-
hensively understood and made accessible to reflection, modification, and change.
5. Concluding remarks
In “Prospects for a theory of nonconceptuality”, Blumenberg wrote:
That the world is a book in which one could read or, after laborious deciphering, 
might finally be able to read is a metaphorical expectation concerning the nature 
of experience. […] The ‘book of nature’ is not merely a subject for topos research-
ers to collect citations on. It is also an orientation for inquiring back from the 
actual status of the theoretical attitude toward the world to the giving of meaning, 
in the life-world, that underlies it. It would be pure romanticism to do this with 
the intention of reestablishing the position of the reader of the book of nature. 
(Blumenberg 1997[1979]: 86)
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Being able to read the world is, as Blumenberg puts it, an expectation prefigured 
by the ‘book-of-life’-metaphor. The same is equally true for the idea that habits 
can be read – there is no use in trying to resist this metaphor. Likewise, it seems, 
‘clarity’ and ‘distinctness’ are expectations, perhaps not merely metaphorical (pre-
figured for example by ‘light’ as a metaphor for truth in philosophical discourse, 
cf. Blumenberg 1993) but habitual in the sense that they structure expectations 
concerning accepted modes of inquiry. Clarity, for example, can be schematized 
as the unperturbed line and distinctness as a circle that differentiates between 
the inside and the outside. The impossibility of reclaiming the lost vantage point 
of perfect clarity and distinctness may be a disappointing prospect for bearers of 
habits of clarity and distinctness. However, it is also a precondition of the possibil-
ity for change. If there is no interference in direction and no permeability between 
opposites, there is simply no room for variation.
Considered in relation to its own genesis and in comparison with concepts 
fashioned from the same cloth of resistance to Cartesianism, it seems obvious that 
habit is an important key term for semiotics, not only because it explains several 
background operations of sign action, but also especially because it explains these 
background operations in relation to key terms in other areas of research. The 
concept of habit provides points of insertion for semiotic inquiry into disciplines 
such as hermeneutics, the sociology and history of power and conceptual his-
tory. It shows that interdisciplinary cross-fertilization between semiotics and other 
areas of inquiry is productive not only in the sense that it is possible to redescribe 
one discipline from the perspective of another (e.g. ‘the semiotics of history’ or 
‘the history of semiotics’), but that various disciplines can be productively rede-
scribed as fundamentally co-extensive in regard to some of their basic disciplin-
ary assumptions. Employing a Peircean expression from the late “Habituesence” 
manuscript, all inquiry shares “essentially the same interpretive consciousness in 
every case” (MS 930: 32–33). This central semiotic tenet is realized, for example, 
through the general semiotics of Peirce, but it appears to be the case especially also 
in comparison with other fields of inquiry. Habit is a key term of Peircean semiot-
ics, but its scope and value as an interpretive demand regarding the historicization 
of the anticipatory field of preconceptuality only comes to its full potential when 
confronted with that demand from outside of Peircean semiotics.8
8  Th is paper is an expanded version of a presentation given at the 11th Conference of the 
Nordic Association for Semiotic Studies in Stavanger on 13 June 2019. Th e author is grateful 
for the fi nancial support received from the University of Augsburg’s Young Researchers Travel 
Scholarship Program for the attendance of this conference. Th e author would also like to thank 
Aleksandar Feodorov for his helpful comments on the fi nal draft  of this paper and Kerstin 
Bachmeier for her invaluable linguistic support.
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Траектории предвидения: преконцептуальность и 
задача «чтения» привычки
Статья характеризует концепцию привычки (habit) Пирса как важный вклад в 
концепцию пирсовской преконцептуальности. Рассматриваются, во-первых, ее 
функции в знаковом процессе, и, во-вторых, связь с другими концепциями пре-
концептуальности в исследованиях культуры. Понятие предрассудка Ганса-Георга 
Гадамера, понятия преконцептуальности и диспозитива Мишеля Фуко, а также 
понятие метафоры Ганса Блюменберга – все они имеют сходства с некоторыми 
ключевыми характеристиками понятия привычки Пирса. В этом сравнении также 
становится понятно, что в представлении о пирсовском понятии привычки не ука-
зываются некоторые элементы: хотя любое истолкование имплицитно зависит от 
теории историчности и соответствующих правил, эти аспекты возникают только в 
сравнении с теориями, которые эксплицитно сосредоточены именно на них.
Другой вопрос, затронутый в контексте такого сравнения, заключается в актуаль -
ности привычки для теорий концептуальности. Основная часть координирующей 
силы концепта заключается в связанных с ним привычках. Тем не менее, на данный 
момент отсутствуют систематические исследования относительно цельного пони-
мания реальных привычек. Поэтому в статье предпринимается попытка исправить 
эту ситуацию, разрабатывая аспекты пирсовской теории привычки, имеющие отно-
шение к теории «чтения привычки» (reading habit).
Etteaimamise trajektoorid: prekontseptuaalsus ja 
harjumuse lugemise ülesanne.
Artiklis iseloomustatakse Peirce’i harjumuse mõistet kui olulist panust Peirce’i prekont-
septuaalsuse mõistesse, esmalt seoses selle funktsiooniga märgiprotsessis ja teiseks seoses 
muude kultuuriuuringutes esinevate prekontseptuaalsuse mõistetega. Nii Hans-Georg 
Gadameri eelarvamuse mõistel, Michel Foucault’ arusaamadel prekontseptuaalsusest ja 
‘dispositif’ist kui ka Hans Blumenbergi metafoorikontseptsioonil on kõigil võtmetähen-
duslikke ühiseid omadusi Peirce’i harjumuse mõistega. Samas võrdluses tuleb esile ka tõik, 
et Peirce’i harjumuse mõistet puudutavast praegusest diskursusest puuduvad teatud ele-
mendid: kuigi igasugune harjumuse mõiste tõlgendamine sõltub implitsiitselt ajaloolisuse 
teooriast ning seosest reeglitega, tulevad need aspektid ilmsiks üksnes võrreldes teooria-
tega, mis neile eksplitsiitsemalt keskenduvad. 
Veel üks küsimus, mis sellise kõrvutuse kontekstis tekib, on harjumuse olulisus kont-
septuaalsuse teooriate jaoks. Suur osa mõistete koordineerivast jõust peitub mõistega seon-
duvates harjumustes. Ent tegelike harjumuste konkreetsemaks muutmise võimalikkust ei 
ole süstemaatiliselt uuritud. Seega püütakse seda olukorda parandada, käsitledes põhjali-
kumalt Peirce harjumusteooria neid aspekte, mis on olulised “harjumuse lugemise” teooria 
jaoks, ning pakkudes visandit sellisest teooriast.
